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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Michael Anderson appeals from his convictions of two counts of aggravated
assault and a weapons enhancement on one of those counts, asserting that the district
court erred by not declaring a mistrial when his jury pool was tainted during voir dire by
improper commentary regarding his incarceration and his ability to assert his innocence
against the State's evidence.

As such, this Court should vacate his convictions and

remand his case for a new trial.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Anderson was convicted by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault.
(R., pp.96-98.) Count I alleged aggravated assault against Sherri Espinola and Count II
alleged aggravated assault against Gloria Benton. (R., p.27.) The jury also found that
Mr. Anderson used a deadly weapon in both offenses, which, because both counts
arose from the same course of conduct, resulted in a sentencing enhancement (alleged
as Count Ill) applied to one of those convictions. (See, e.g., Tr., p.185, L.24 - p.186,
L.20.) Ultimately, Mr. Anderson was sentenced to a unified term of five years, with one
year fixed, on Count I, and a concurrent ten-year unified sentence, with one year fixed,
on Count II (which incorporated the enhancement in Count Iii), for an aggregate
sentence of ten years, with one year fixed. (R., p.103.)
After making its introductory remarks at Mr. Anderson's trial, the district court
opened the questioning of Mr. Anderson's potential jury by asking whether any of the

1

potential jurors had prior knowledge of the case.

(Supp. Tr., p.15, Ls.5-14.) 1

The

second potential juror to respond to that question, Juror 12, 2 said in front of the whole
panel, "I am an Ada County deputy sheriff.

I've been involved in the defendant's

incarceration .... I don't know anything about the case.

I've just - he's been in my

housing unit before." (Supp. Tr., p.16, Ls.15-17.) At that point, fourteen minutes into
the proceedings, defense counsel requested a sidebar, which was not transcribed.
(See Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.1-4; R., p.51.) After that sidebar, the district court instructed

the jury that the fact that Mr. Anderson had been arrested could not be used as
evidence of guilt. (Supp. Tr., p.17, Ls.5-24.) The district court did not dismiss Juror 12
for cause at that time, nor did either party move on the record at that time for the court
to do so. (See generally Supp. Tr., pp.17-18.)
During the first recess taken by the district court, the parties made a record of
what occurred during the sidebar.

(See Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.7-8.)

Defense counsel

indicated that he had moved for a mistrial based on Juror 12's comments because all
the potential juror had said was that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated in the
potential juror's unit "before." (Supp. Tr., p.75, Ls.9-21.) The district court indicated that
it had denied the motion because it felt the jury was not unfairly tainted because of the
context of the comment, as well as the prosecutor's indication that he intended to
present evidence of that fact anyway. (Supp. Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.10.) The district
court also stated that, while it intended to dismiss Juror 12 for cause, "I wait until after
the conclusion of voir dire to do that so we don't have a mass exodus when people

1

The supplemental volume of transcripts contains the voir dire of the jury, the
instructing of the jury, the opening and closing arguments of counsel, and the reading of
the verdict.
2

figure what it takes to get out of jury duty." (Supp. Tr., p.76, L.11 - p.77, LB.) Defense
counsel made some comments as to the propriety of that decision, given the fact that
additional questions might provoke a response from Juror 12, and the district court
indicated that it had decided to dismiss Juror 12 after the recess. (Tr., p.76, Ls.18-24,
p.77, Ls.19-21.) When asked if he objected to that procedure, the prosecutor stated
that he had intended to ask Juror 12 certain questions about police procedures in order
to educate the jury, and the district court responded: "You want to educate the rest of
the jury by questioning him, and you're going to find another way to educate them.
I don't want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might." (Supp. Tr., p.78,
Ls.10-22.) The district court did not immediately dismiss Juror 12 after the break, but it
ultimately did so, approximately one and one-half hours after the sidebar.

(Supp.

Tr., p.79, L.1 - p.84, L.4; R., pp.51-52.)
When it dismissed Juror 12, the district court interrupted the prosecutor's voir dire
of Juror 32, a former legal assistant of thirty years, who had stated in front of the whole
panel "I am very biased, very prejudiced .... I have no use for people with a victim
mentality.... I have no tolerance for people with a victim mentality." (Supp. Tr., p.80,
L.20 - p.81, L.81, p.83, L.25 - p.84, L.10 (the district court interrupting the voir dire to
dismiss Juror 12).)

Juror 32 defined a "victim mentality" as "[w]on't or can't take

responsibility for their own actions or interactions. It's always somebody else's fault."
(Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.4-8.) The prosecutor followed up on that comment, saying "[There
are] going to be some people who come in, and they are going to say, 'This thing
happened. I saw this, I heard this, I felt like this.' The court may occasionally call them

2

The prosecutor decided to refer to the jurors by number instead of name, and defense
counsel conformed to that procedure. (Supp. Tr., p.25, L.19 - p.26, L.1, p.91, L.17 p.92, L.23.)

3

victims because that's what the law calls them . . . . " (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15.)
Defense counsel objected, asserting that no determination had been made as to
whether any witnesses were "victims" and that was a matter on which the district court
should instruct the jury. (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.16-18.) The district court took note of, but
overruled the objection and stated, "I do my best to refer to them as alleged victims,
because that's what they are until the close of evidence." (Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.19-25.)
However, it was not until approximately two hours later, when reading the pre-proof jury
instructions to the jury, that the district court clarified that the term "victim":
is used only to refer to a person or persons who are alleged to have been
victimized, and is used only for convenience. It does not indicate any
opinion on my part that a person is a victim, or that the defendant has
committed an offense. Whether a person is a victim, and whether the
defendant is guilty of any offense, are matters for you alone to determine
based on the evidence presented at trial.
(Tr., p.155, Ls.6-16; R. p.67; see R., p.52 (the minutes indicating the chronological gap
between defense counsel's objection and the reading of the pre-proof instructions).)
After the district court's initial comment on the use of the term "victim," the prosecutor
resumed his voir dire of Juror 32 in regard to her definition of the term "victim mentality,"
which resulted in the following exchange in the presence of the whole panel:
Q. You understand that Mr. Anderson has no duty to present a defense or
any evidence, okay? I have a duty to put on enough evidence to convince
all of you beyond a reasonable doubt that things happened that the judge
says have to happen before you can check the guilty box, right? If he
[Mr. Anderson] chooses to present evidence and it is evidence, or his
lawyer chooses to question the witnesses, the gist of which is, "Well, it
didn't happen that way," or, "You shouldn't believe him," or, "It happened,
but it doesn't mean what the state says it means," is that going to be a
victim mentality for you?

A Yes.
Q. Okay. Well, you kind of understand that's the way the system works,

right?
4

A I don't believe it's the way the system is meant to work.
Q. Okay.

A It is the way it works unfortunately.
(Supp. Tr., p.82, L 16 - p.83, L.5.) Neither party moved to remove Juror 12 for cause. 3
(See generally Supp. Tr.; R., pp.51-53.) Ultimately, the jury was selected and sworn,

and the evidentiary presentation began.
The evidence as to the events which the State alleged qualified as aggravated
assault was only presented through the testimony of Gloria Benton and Sherri Espinola
and a video recording from a surveillance camera (identified as State's Exhibit 1).
Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola were working at a Rite-Aid store. (Tr., p.37, Ls.10-17.)
Mr. Anderson entered that store with the intent to purchase some beer.

(Tr., p.39,

L.16 - p.40, L. 13.) As Mr. Anderson waited in the checkout line, an unidentified male
customer got into line behind him.
22:21 :47.) 4

(See Tr., p.51, Ls.7-22; State's Exhibit 1 at

Ms. Benton was engaged in a relatively long checkout with another

customer. (Tr., p.40, Ls.6-18.) Mr. Anderson became agitated at the delay, and began
mumbling curses to himself. (Tr., p.41, Ls.1-6.)
At that same time, Ms. Espinola, the supervisor on duty that night, came over to
Ms. Benton's register to retrieve a pack of cigarettes for another customer. (Tr., p.41,
Ls.9-12, p.88, L17 - p.90, L.2, p.91, Ls.6-8.)

Ms. Espinola heard Mr. Anderson's

comments, which she considered to be belligerent, and so she intervened in the
situation. (Tr., p.91, Ls.8-10.) When she saw that Mr. Anderson intended to purchase

Juror 32 was not a member of the jury panel which heard the case. (Supp. Tr., p.6,
Ls.6-19.)
4 State's Exhibit 1 simultaneously presents the recordings from multiple security
cameras. There is no audio. Display 5 is the recording of the camera overlooking the
3

5

beer, she testified that she said, "'Clearly you must be intoxicated already,' because he
started swearing at me." (Tr., p.93, Ls.21-23.) Ms. Espinola decided she would not let
Mr. Anderson buy the beer and so moved the beer, which Mr. Anderson had placed on
the counter, away from him, asked Mr. Anderson to leave the store, and threatened to
call the police. (Tr., p.93, L.23 - p.94, L2, p.42, Ls.2-9.) Mr. Anderson became more
agitated, and he stepped up to and past the register. 5

(See State's Exhibit 1 at

22:23:00.) As he did so, both Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola testified that Mr. Anderson
became upset to the point of yelling and cursing, raised his shirt, displayed the
sheathed knife concealed underneath, tapped the handle, and threatened them. (Tr.,
p.42, L.15 - p.44, L.9, p.95, L.10 - p.96, 15.)
After the State rested its case, defense counsel moved for a judgment of
acquittal for insufficient evidence, specifically asserting that the evidence had not
shown that the threat was imminent. (Tr., p.171, Ls.1-17.) The district court denied
that motion, finding that sufficient evidence had been presented for the jury to find
Mr. Anderson guilty, which the jury ultimately did. (Tr., p.173, Ls.1-10; R., pp.96-98.)
The district court imposed a five-year unified sentence, with one year fixed, for Count I,
and a ten-year unified sentence, with one year fixed, for Count II, which included the
sentencing enhancement. (Tr., p.200, Ls.7-12; R., p.103.) The district court ordered
the sentences to be served concurrently and credited Mr. Anderson with 167 days of
pre-judgment incarceration.

(Tr., p.202, Ls.16-17; R., p.103.)

Mr. Anderson filed a

timely Notice of Appeal from the Judgment of Conviction. (R., pp.108-10.)

register in question. It has a time and date stamp, which will be referenced to promote
clarity when referring to the video.
5 The customer upon whom Ms. Benton had been waiting had completed her
transaction and moved away from the counter as Ms. Espinola moved to intervene with
Mr. Anderson. (See State's Exhibit 1 at 22:23:00.)
6

ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the potential jury pool
was tainted by comments on Mr. Anderson's incarceration and by comments on his guilt
and ability to assert his innocence against the State's evidence.

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Not Declaring A Mistrial After The Potential Jury Pool Was
Tainted By Comments On Mr. Anderson's Incarceration And By Comments On His Guilt
And Ability To Assert His Innocence Against The State's Evidence

A

Introduction
The jury pool was initially tainted, necessitating a mistrial, when the second

response to the district court's first question to the panel, offered by an Ada County
sheriff's deputy, informed the pool that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated "before."
Whether the potential jurors could have interpreted that as "Mr. Anderson has been
incarcerated on this charge since the events at issue" or "Mr. Anderson has been
convicted and incarcerated in the past," that comment was prejudicial and should have
resulted in a mistrial.

Both alternative interpretations unduly prejudiced the jury pool

against Mr. Anderson.
Assuming, arguendo, that comment alone was insufficient to justify a mistrial,
subsequent comments on Mr. Anderson's guilt and ability to challenge the State's
evidence, compounded the error to the point that a mistrial should have been declared.
First, one juror, formerly a legal assistant in a law firm, essentially told the panel that the
system was not intended to allow the defense to assert his innocence and challenge
the evidence presented by the State or otherwise show the State's interpretation of that
evidence was flawed; that was just the guilty defendant having a victim mentality,
refusing to accept responsibility for his actions.

Second, the district court told the

potential jury pool that Ms. Benton and Ms. Espinola had to be referred to as "alleged
victims" until the close of evidence, implying that, at that point, they would be shown to
be true victims. The district court was aware how substantially the potential jurors had
been prejudiced by the first juror's comment, and so by not declaring a mistrial after
8

these subsequent, prejudicial comments, it erroneously proceeded with the trial. In light
of the prejudice recognized by the district court, there is reasonable doubt that the
prejudice from that comment influenced the jury's decision.

8.

Juror 12's Comments, Which Informed The Jury Pool That Mr. Anderson Had
Been Incarcerated "Before" Unduly Prejudiced The Jury Pool, And The District
Court Erred By Denying Defense Counsel's Motion For A Mistrial
The United States Constitution guarantees the defendant's right to a fair and

impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; see, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 509-10 (1995).

Those protections are incorporated against the states via the

Fourteenth Amendment. Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 364 (1966); State v. Needs,
99 Idaho 883, 890 n.4 (1979). The Idaho Constitution affords similar protections. Idaho
Const. art. I,§§ 7, 13; see, e.g., State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542,547 (1990) overruled by
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991). Idaho has also enacted statutes and court rules to

protect this right. See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann.§ 19-1902, -2019, -2020; I.C.R. 24(b).
Idaho's appellate courts effectively review denials of motions for mistrial de novo.
State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571 (2007).

[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably
exercised his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the
mistrial motion was made. Rather, the question must be whether the
event which precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible
error when viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion
for mistrial has been denied in a criminal case, the "abuse of discretion"
standard is a misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of
reversible error. Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the
incident that triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge's refusal to
declare a mistrial will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed
retrospectively, constituted reversible error.
Id .(quoting State v. Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 912 (2003)(quoting State v.
Shepherd, 124 Idaho 54, 57 (Ct. App. 1993)(quoting State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95

9

(Ct. App. 1983)))). Additionally, the appellate courts first determine if there was error,
then decide whether it was harmless. Id.
There were two ways for the potential jury to have taken Juror 12's comments:
either "that Mr. Anderson was incarcerated on this charge and remained incarcerated at
the time of the trial" or "that Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated for some other offense
in the past."

(See Tr., p.75, Ls.7-21.)

As to the first alternative interpretation,

references to the fact that a defendant has been or remains jailed on the charged
offense are inappropriate and prejudicial. State v. Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 506-07 (Ct.
App. 2001) (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (holding that requiring
the defendant to appear at trial in prison garb prejudiced the jury because it created "an
unacceptable risk ... of impermissible factors coming into play"); State v. Tucker, 226
Conn. 618 (1993) (informing the jury that the defendant is in jail creates an improper
inference of guilt); Haywood v. State, 107 Nev. 285 (1991) (same); State v. Martini, 131
N.J. 176 (1993) overruled by State v. Fortin, 178 NJ 540 (2004); State v. Childs, 204
N.J. Super. 639 (App. Div. 1985) (same); State v. Martinez, 624 A2d 291 (R.L 1993)
(same)).
As to the second alternative interpretation, references to prior convictions are
inadmissible except in certain, limited circumstances.

See, e.g., State v. Grist, 147

Idaho 49, 52 (2009). The evidence of prior crimes must be relevant to a material and
disputed issue in the crime charged. 6 Id.

6

In this case, to be admissible, the prior convictions would have to be relevant to
whether Mr. Anderson actually did threaten either Ms. Benton or Ms. Espinola with
imminent harm in order to be relevant to a material and disputed issue of the crime
charged. See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. The elements of that offense, and thus the
material issues therein, are discussed in depth in Section ll(B), supra. Any prior
incarceration has not been alleged as related to those material issues, nor would an
offer of proof make such a demonstration. Therefore, incarceration for a prior crime,
10

The prejudicial effect of such testimony is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial
because he is a man of criminal character. It, therefore, takes the
jury away from their primary consideration of [the defendant's] guilt or
innocence of the particular crime on trial.
State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 510 (1978). As such, regardless of which of the two

alternative

interpretations

the

potential jurors

adopted,

those

comments

on

Mr. Anderson's incarceration were prejudicial and erroneous. Thus, the only question is
whether the error was harmless, which it was not.
When there is error, if the appellate court is able to determine "beyond a
reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the evidence
complained about contributed to the conviction," then the error is harmless. Harrison,
136 Idaho at 506 (quoting Shepherd, 124 Idaho at 58).

While the comment on

incarceration itself does not always require a new trial, see Harrison, 136 Idaho at
506-07, the timing of the comment is critical. In this case, there is reasonable doubt
about whether those comments contributed to the conviction, making them not
harmless.
Juror 12, a corrections officer working at the jail, made his comments in response
to the district court's first question on voir dire. (Tr., p.15, L.5 - p.16, L.25.) That means
that, essentially from the outset of the trial proceedings, the potential jurors knew that
Mr. Anderson had been incarcerated, and thus, from the outset of the trial proceedings,
had it in their minds that Mr. Anderson was of a criminal disposition, with the implication

if any, is not relevant to the material and disputed issues of the offense charged.
See Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. Prior convictions may also be used to impeach a witness.
See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 107 Idaho 96, 102-03 (Ct. App. 1984). However, it is
impermissible to impeach a witness before they have testified. Van Brunt v. Stoddard;
136 Idaho 681, 685 (2001 ). As Mr. Anderson did not testify in this case, prior
convictions could not be used impeach his truthfulness. Id. Thus, there is no exception
under which prior convictions would be relevant in this case.
11

that he was guilty of the offense on trial. See Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506; Wrenn, 99
Idaho at 510. Furthermore, because Juror 12 was not dismissed for cause at that time,
the potential jurors had it in their minds that such information or mindset was not
particularly troubling in terms of impartiality or bias. Instead, the entire trial proceeding
began with an inappropriate comment on guilt and proceeded with that undertone.
In fact, the district court recognized just how prejudicial that comment was. In
deciding whether to dismiss Juror 12 for cause, the prosecutor requested the district
court not exercise that discretion because he wanted to question Juror 12 about police
response procedures. (Tr., p.78, Ls.10-17.) The district court responded: "You want to
educate the rest of the jury by questioning him, and you're going to find another way to
educate them. I don't want to have a mistrial, and I'm quite concerned that we might."
(Tr., p.78, Ls.18-22 (emphasis added).)

By the district court's own admission, Juror

12's comments had pushed the case to the line of whether a mistrial was necessary. It
cannot be said, particularly in light of the district court's comment, that there is no
reasonable doubt that the prejudice from that comment did not influence the jury's
decision.
The only reason the district court did not grant the motion for a mistrial was that it
had given what it felt to be a sufficient curative instruction. (Tr., p.75, L.22 - p.76, L.10,
p.17, Ls.5-18.)

That did not, however, alleviate the undertone that permeated the

proceedings from that point forward: that Mr. Anderson was in jail, and thus more likely
to be guilty. See Harrison, 136 Idaho at 506; Wrenn, 99 Idaho at 510. Additionally, the
fact that Juror 12 was not immediately dismissed for cause indicated to the jury that his

12

comments were not overly problematic.7 As a result, other potential jurors may have
been induced not to speak up, even though they may have had underlying biases
against Mr. Anderson.

After all, if one of the officers who oversees Mr. Anderson's

incarceration is allowed to remain in the jury pool, why should their own biases as to
guilt be more problematic than Juror 12's? Accordingly, even though the defense still
had an opportunity for individual voir dire after Juror 12's comments, that voir dire may
have been wholly ineffective at guaranteeing an impartial jury since the jurors had been
misled as to what it means to be truly impartial.
In fact, because the comment was made so early in the proceedings, fourteen
minutes in, to be precise (R., p.51), the district court should have been more compelled
to simply start with a fresh jury pool, rather than continue with a tainted jury pool. As
such, because Juror 12's comments tainted the jury pool, the district court erred in not
ordering a mistrial following his comments.

C.

Even If Juror 12's Comments Alone Were Insufficient To Justify A Mistrial, When
Reviewed In Light Of The Compounding Prejudice Caused By Subsequent
Comments On Mr. Anderson's Guilt And Ability To Assert His Innocence,
Mr. Anderson Is Entitled To A Mistrial Because His Jury Was lmpermissibly
Prejudiced
Two comments subsequent to Juror 12's prejudicial remarks further demonstrate

that the jury pool was tainted and a mistrial should have been ordered. First, Juror 32, a
former legal assistant with thirty years of experience, made a rather concerning

7

The district court's rationale for not immediately removing Juror 12 for cause was

"I wait until after the conclusion of voir dire to [excuse jurors for cause] so we don't have
a mass exodus when people figure what it takes to get out of jury duty." (Tr., p.77,
Ls.5-8.) With this statement, the district court acknowledged that the decision of
whether to dismiss a potential juror for cause sends implicit messages to the jury pool.
Therefore, just as the potential jurors may get the message that by expressing certain
opinions, they may be excused from the jury, they may also get the message that, when
13

statement about how the trial process should work after declaring herself to be "very
biased":
Q. Can you let go of your former life and just accept the role as a juror if

you are selected here?
A. I don't know. I'm very biased, very prejudiced.
Q. Okay. For or against who?
A. I have no use for people with a victim mentality.
Q. I'm sorry.

I can't hear the juror, the answer.

A. I have no tolerance for people with a victim mentality.
Q. Can you tell me what a victim mentality is?

A. Won't or can't take responsibility for their own actions or interactions.
It's always somebody else's fault.

(Supp. Tr., p.80, L.17 - p.81, L.8.) The prosecutor subsequently returned to this issue,
and Juror 32 added to her prior statements:
Q. You understand that Mr. Anderson has no duty to present a defense or

any evidence, okay? ... If he chooses to question the witnesses, the gist
of which is, "Well, it didn't happen that way," or, "You shouldn't believe
him," or, "It happened, but it doesn't mean what the state says it means,"
is that going to be a victim mentality for you?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Well, you kind of understand that's the way the system works,

right?
A. I don't believe it's the way the system is meant to work.
Q. Okay.
A. It's the way it works unfortunately.

a juror expresses a concern about a potential bias and is not excused, that bias is not
problematic for a juror to have.
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(Supp. Tr., p.82, L 16 - p.83, 5 (emphasis added).) Juror 32, a person with thirty years
of experience working in the legal field, told the panel that the system was not designed
to allow the defendant to assert his innocence or challenge the evidence presented by
the State, and it is "unfortunate" that the defendant is allowed to maintain his innocence
against the State's evidence. There was no curative instruction issued following this
troublesome and prejudicial expression regarding the legal system and the defendant's
ability to maintain his innocence. (See generally Tr.)
And while there was no contemporaneous objection, the appellate courts review
a motion for mistrial, such as the one made after Juror 12's prejudicial comments, in
light of the entire record.

Field, 144 Idaho at 571.

Instead of looking just at the

propriety of the district court's actions in regard to the circumstances giving rise to the
objection in isolation, the appellate court must consider the continuing impact on the
trial. Id. Thus, where, as here, the jury pool was subjected to prejudice by first one,
then another juror's comments, the appellate court should vacate the conviction and
remand for a new trial because of the aggregated prejudice, even though the motion for
a mistrial may not be renewed. See id. In this case, where Juror 12's comments had
already pushed the case to the limit of prejudice that could be withstood without
declaring a mistrial (see Tr., p.78, Ls.18-22), Juror 32's highly-prejudicial comments,
which is not only a repudiation of the presumption of innocence, but an affirmation that if
Mr. Anderson asserts his against the State's evidence, that is actually more evidence
of guilt, pushed the issue over the edge.
Critically, Juror 32's comments were a blatant misstatement of the law, as the
defendant has a right to challenge or rebut the State's evidence. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend VI (the defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him).
15

Furthermore, Juror 32 was never dismissed for cause. (See R., pp.51-52; see generally
Tr.) That would convey to the other members of the jury pool that such a bias as Juror
32 expressed was acceptable and perhaps need not be brought up during voir dire.
Thus, the potential jurors were left to believe a major (and uncorrected) misstatement
regarding the trial process and even though the defense still had an opportunity for
individual voir dire, that voir dire may have been wholly ineffective at guaranteeing an
impartial jury since the jurors had been misled as to what it means to be truly impartial.
To make matters worse, Juror 32's comments followed immediately after
misstatements by the prosecutor and district court which presented as a comment on
guilt. In trying to clarify what Juror 32 meant by "victim mentality," the prosecutor said
"[There are] going to be some people who come in, and they're going to say, 'This thing
happened. I saw this, I heard this, I felt this.' The court may occasionally call them
victims because that's what the law calls them, but .... " (Tr., p.81, Ls.10-15.) Defense
counsel objected and the district court responded, saying: "I do my best to refer to them
as alleged victims, because that's what they are until the close of evidence." (Tr., p.81,
Ls.22-23.) The natural implication from that statement is that, once the evidence period
closes, then we can refer to them as actual victims, as opposed to "alleged" victims
because the evidence will show that they were actually victimized by the defendant.
(See Tr., p.81, Ls.22-23.)

This is particularly problematic in this case, because Mr. Anderson was charged
with aggravated assault by making threats.

(R, pp.26-27.)

For the district court to

imply that, at the end of the evidentiary presentation, the evidence would show the two
witnesses had been victimized (i.e., threatened) by the defendant, and thus could be
referred to as "victims," implies that Mr. Anderson would be shown guilty at the end of
16
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the evidentiary presentation.

Such comments on guilt are impermissible.

See, e.g.,

State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 86 (Ct. App. 2007). And while the district court did
eventually instruct the jury in regard to the use of the term "victim" (Tr., p.155, Ls.6-16;
R., p.67) that instruction came nearly two hours after the improper comments.
(R., pp.52-53.) As such, the damage was done. The prosecutor's and district court's

implications that Mr. Anderson would be guilty after the evidentiary presentation ended
had the opportunity to settle into the jurors' minds before any corrective efforts were
taken.

Additionally, since Juror 32 was not dismissed for cause at that point, other

jurors could have received the impression that such perspectives were not overly
problematic or worth mentioning during the remainder of the voir dire process, further
depriving Mr. Anderson of a fair and impartial jury.
These errors, which demonstrate a reasonable doubt that they affected the jury's
decision, particularly when those comments were combined with Juror 32's prejudicial
commentary and Juror 12's prejudicial remarks, so as to demand that this Court vacate
the conviction because of the impermissibly tainted jury pool. See Field, 144 Idaho at
571. The jury pool was unacceptably tainted before the panel was even selected.
And to the extent that this Court disagrees with Mr. Anderson as to the prejudicial
nature of each of the statements discussed infra, those erroneous statements, when
aggregated, demonstrate that Mr. Anderson was deprived of a fair trial before an
impartial and unbiased jury, in contravention of his constitutional rights to due process.

State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994); State v. Paciorek, 137 Idaho 629, 635
(Ct. App. 2002); State v. Vandenacre, 131 Idaho 507, 513 (Ct. App. 1998). As such,
based on either the individual errors or the aggregation of those individual errors, this
Court should vacate Mr. Anderson's conviction and remand for further proceedings.
17

CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and
remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 11 th day of June, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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